Multi-unit auctions, information and strategic bidding behaviour: using the example of electricity markets
In this project, we study empirical bidding behaviour in standardised multi-unit auction settings based on real-world electricity market auctions. We are particularly interested in questions concerning strategic bidding, information transparency and market power of individual bidders. We analyse the causal effects of information using systematic variations in economics experiments, based on the theory of supply function competition.
For the empirical part of the study, economics experiments were conducted with students and with Swissgrid employees.
At a glance
Duration: 2016 - 2018
Funding: SCCER CREST, UNSW Australia, ZHAW, ShanghaiTech University
- Swissgrid, January 2017
- EAERE, June 2017, Athens
- Alpenrhein Seminar on Economic Policy hosted by the Research Unit for Economic Policy (ZWF) of the University of Applied Sciences HTW Chur and the Liechtenstein Institute, December 2017
Lead: Andreas Hefti (FWP, ZHAW/UZH) (contact: email@example.com)
Regina Betz (CEE, ZHAW)
Peiyao Shen (Shanghai University of Technology)
Iain MacGill (CEEM, UNSW Australia)